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It is easy to label Søren Kierkegaard a typical nineteenth century misogynist.  
He often makes snide comments about woman’s nature, mocking with utmost 
irony her “great abilities” and sneering at the possibility of her emancipation.  He 
declares outright against the social and political equality of the sexes, even while 
asserting the inherent equality of all people before God.  Given this, it is 
understandable that Kierkegaard leaves a bad taste in the mouths of many feminist 
readers; much of what he has to say about women is hard for a female philosopher 
to swallow.  However, reading Kierkegaard as a straight misogynist is highly 
problematic.  Due to the pseudonymous nature of most of his work, reading 
Kierkegaard incautiously can cause a great deal of confusion and 
misunderstanding. 
The task a critical feminist reader of Kierkegaard undertakes is not an easy 
one: any attempt to sort Kierkegaard’s voice from the playful voices of his various 
pseudonyms is complicated by obvious obstacles, but the rewards of such an effort 
may be well worth the trouble.  The point of embarking on this project is at least 
two-fold: on the one hand, as historians of philosophy it is important to distinguish 
the truly patriarchal and misogynistic philosophers from those who may have been 
female-friendly (if not feminist); on the other hand, this task may help us to see if 
there is some benefit to be reaped from a feminist reading of Kierkegaard.  Yet as 
feminists we may be able to reap a great many benefits from reading Kierkegaard 
critically even without fully uncovering his personal thoughts on women.  The fact 
of the man’s misogyny (or lack thereof) is perhaps less important to feminism than 
the various questions and challenges he posed to Western philosophy.  Even 
though he often expressed a misogynistic attitude, Kierkegaard also took a hammer 
to the cold foundations of traditional Western philosophy; he opened up a space 
within philosophy for existentialism, and as a result of this space feminism has 
been able to develop.1  For this reason, I will explore the complex relationship 
between Kierkegaard and feminism in the following paper.   
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To begin with, I will consider the complexities that arise for feminist 
interpretation as a result of the pseudonymous nature of Kierkegaard’s works.  
Keeping these lessons in mind, I will investigate the negative aspects of 
Kierkegaard’s relationship to feminism: the misogyny throughout his 
pseudonymous works.  I will do so via a look at his first published work, a very 
short essay entitled “Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities,” and by 
examining the disparaging manner in which women are depicted in his renowned 
novel The Seducer’s Diary from Either/Or, as well as other offensive allusions to 
women throughout the Kierkegaardian canon in order to set up the challenge of 
Kierkegaard to feminism.  Then, the focus of this paper will turn from the negative 
to the positive aspects for feminism in Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  His discussion 
of Mary and other female knights of faith throughout his work may prove to be 
female empowering; additionally, Kierkegaard’s discussion of equality before God 
must be thoroughly investigated in order to see whether this might have some 
benefit to feminists today.  By employing some of the essays in Léon and Walsh’s 
anthology Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, we can gain an idea as to 
how Kierkegaard has been read by recent feminists in order to see what a feminist 
employment of Kierkegaard would look like.  Following this discussion, I will 
explore the connection between Kierkegaard's existentialism and Simone de 
Beauvoir's existential ethics of ambiguity.  From this investigation we can see how 
Kierkegaard may be of use to feminism in yet another way, and in ways that have 
yet to be disclosed. 
 
Stumbling Through the Funhouse: The Complications of Kierkegaard’s 
Pseudonyms to Feminist Interpretation 
Interpreting Kierkegaard is problematic due to the fact that he wrote with 
two hands: with his right hand he wrote as himself, and with his left he adopted a 
number of pseudonyms so that he could express himself indirectly through his 
aesthetic works.  These various pseudonyms seriously complicate the matter of 
reaching a critical understanding as to what Kierkegaard himself believes: “The 
world of the pseudonyms is a world of stratagem and illusion, a world of trap doors 
and hidden panels, where one is never quite sure where one is or to whom one is 
listening.  In this questionable territory the critic must proceed with great caution, 
for the persona he at one moment identifies with Kierkegaard may in the next turn 
out to be only the author’s foil” (Thompson 1972, vi).  As we attempt to journey 
through this Kierkegaardian funhouse, we must keep in mind that things are not 
always as they seem.  Though it is easy to be duped by this great dramatic ironist, 
Kierkegaard would not have wanted for us to focus only on the theatrics once the 
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curtain has come up: the whole scene, including the stage, the audience, and the 
theatre itself must be taken into account. 
Hence, it is essential that we think of these pseudonyms as players in a 
drama Kierkegaard has created, and not hold the director or the playwright 
immediately responsible for the words of his characters: 
The role of Kierkegaard is rather that of the stage director.  He stages 
his pseudonyms, or rather altogether they make up the performance, 
the unfinished dialogue about the possibilities and impossibilities of 
human life.  He was also himself a personal participant in – and 
spectator to – the existential crises or alienation of humanity.  
Kierkegaard was a dialectician and the confrontation still works: no 
two of us are today completely agreed about what he meant: we are 
still uncertain about what existence is – and that was precisely his 
intension.  (Bertung 1997, 54)  
It would be wrong to assume the pseudonyms express Kierkegaard’s own 
thoughts, just as it would be wrong to assume that King Lear speaks for 
Shakespeare.  He distanced himself from the pseudonyms to the extent that he even 
wrote reviews of his own pseudonymous works.  In this way, he formulated the 
poststructural idea of a text as opposed to a book – in a text the author is irrelevant.  
Should it occur to someone to quote the text, Kierkegaard asked that they cite the 
pseudonym (Kierkegaard 1992, 627); Kierkegaard himself is merely the author of 
the authors.  He uses the pseudonyms to express different views, different voices, 
but mostly to get people to move towards Christianity via indirect incitement.      
Why does he need the pseudonyms?  Why not speak to us directly?  Because 
for Kierkegaard direct communication is “suited only for unimportant matters – 
grocery bills, logical truths, taxonomies.  To talk about ourselves and what makes 
our lives ebb and flow (what Kierkegaard called ‘the ethico-religious’), we must 
use language in a different way, letting metaphor replace literal sense, and 
ambiguity fertilize the private spaces of our imagination” (Thompson 1972, vii).  
The ambiguity of the human condition requires that we do not speak directly about 
it; Kierkegaard wrote pseudonymously because he believed the nature of human 
consciousness to be itself ambiguous, and so indirect communication can actually 
be a more effective means of expression. 
Along similar lines, there is another reason why Kierkegaard chose to write 
pseudonymously; Kierkegaard felt it is impossible to write a book about God and 
Christianity (the great paradox) directly, but to write a book and revoke it is not the 
same as allowing it to remain unwritten.  It is written, and then it is erased by the 
pseudonym – that is better than never writing it at all.  Through the use of the 
pseudonyms, his texts unsay what they have said, in order to keep what is said 
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alive.  The indirect discourse allows him to communicate with people without 
interfering with their God-relationship.  He can push his readers, incite them, 
without laying any claim to the insights they may gain from the texts.  This is 
important because the pseudonymous works are addressed to a world that 
conceives itself to already be Christian; the pseudonyms intend to clear away this 
illusion.  Kierkegaard has to convert people to Christianity when they already think 
they are Christian, so he uses the left hand to do this.    
Unlike the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard does lay claim to the 
authorship of the Upbuilding Discourses and Works of Love; when referring to the 
confusion over the authorship of the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard wrote:  
My role is the joint of being the secretary and, quite ironically, the 
dialectically reduplicated author of the author or the authors.  
Therefore, although probably everyone who has been concerned at all 
about such things has until now summarily regarded me as the author 
of the pseudonymous books even before the explanation was at hand, 
the explanation will perhaps at first prompt the odd impression that I, 
who indeed ought to know it best, am the only one who only very 
doubtfully and equivocally regards me as the author, because I am the 
author in the figurative sense; but on the other hand I am very literally 
and directly the author of, for example, the upbuilding discourses and 
of every word in them. (Kierkegaard 1992, 627)  
Works of Love is written in a different voice (or with a different hand) than 
the pseudonymous works.  Expressed in Works of Love is the voice of a Christian 
writer, not a humorist, though it is written non-dogmatically.  In this book, 
Kierkegaard does not use the humor or irony that are present in the pseudonymous 
works; the right hand straightforwardly expresses his own voice.  He uses the right 
hand to write this sort of sermon, though he does not call it that – rather, he calls it 
an upbuilding (or edifying) work.  These works of love are Christian deliberations; 
a deliberation is an awakening, a gadfly, a call to action.  He wants these 
deliberations to touch our hearts and move us to Christian existential action. 
However, the very notion of direct communication becomes hazy here.  This 
is not just straight communication, because Kierkegaard is preoccupied with how 
he wants us to be touched by this discourse.  It is not direct because he does not 
really want it to be: he wants to awaken love in the other, but in a selfless way.  
Only then can it actually be a work of love itself.  A work of love preformed well 
is self-effacing.  It is about God and the duty to the other, not about Kierkegaard.  
As Kierkegaard understands it, part of his duty to the other is to help them stand on 
their own, independent of him.  So, Kierkegaard has to be somewhat indirect even 
in his direct works: the emphasis must be on God.  Hence, though there is a 
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rigorous difference between his Christian deliberations and his other, 
pseudonymous works, neither is entirely direct.  Yet, it is safe to say Works of Love 
is written in Kierkegaard’s own voice, the voice he lays claim to, and so is in fact 
more direct than his other texts in spite of his emphasis on his self-effacing duty to 
the neighbor.   
Given all of this, what can a feminist reader of Kierkegaard take to be his 
own thoughts on women, and what should she dismiss as the irony or hyperbole of 
his pseudonyms?  Can we take his view of women as it is presented in Works of 
Love to be his honest thoughts on the matter, and reject all of the misogyny of the 
pseudonyms?  And if we choose to do so, where does that leave us: can feminists 
even be satisfied with Kierkegaard’s account of the male/female situation as it is 
given in Works of Love?  
These questions demand of us another, perhaps more important question 
concerning a critical reading of Kierkegaard: as we strive to figure out what 
Kierkegaard really thought about women, to iron out his own implicit philosophy 
of women, we must ask ourselves if this is possible or even really desirable.  There 
may be no way to uncover Kierkegaard’s true thoughts regarding women, for the 
pseudonyms may cloud and confuse any firm understanding of this.  But is there 
no point in a critically feminist reading of Kierkegaard other than to reveal the 
personal thoughts of the man?  Perhaps it would be of more benefit to feminism 
not to read Kierkegaard in search of his own personal stance on the woman 
question, but rather to read him in an exploratory manner as one who has exposed 
new avenues of thought, new ways of examining the woman question.  This may 
be the only way we can fairly read Kierkegaard; any attempt to unearth the “core” 
of his philosophy has been infinitely complicated by his modes of expression.  
And, as Thompson tells us, such an attempt may be futile:   
There may be no ‘core’ of Kierkegaard’s authorship to be 
‘penetrated.’  Henriksen’s metaphor suggests that the essential 
meaning of Kierkegaard’s work still lies hidden, to be revealed by an 
as yet unidentified critical approach.  But if the earlier discussion of 
duplicity and indirect communication is to be taken seriously, we may 
have to construct a new metaphor for talking about Kierkegaard.  
Instead of thinking of his authorship as having a single core of 
meaning, we might think of it as having (like a multifaceted jewel) 
many different meanings depending on the angle from which it is 
illuminated. (Thompson 1972, vii) 
So, as we attempt to situate Kierkegaard within the feminist discourse in 
some way, either positively or negatively, what we are in fact doing is exploring 
these possible meanings, meanings that give birth to a plethora of constructive and 
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deconstructive questions.  Such questions are the vanguards of feminism, for they 
are motivators of feminist discourse and instigators of revolutionary thought. 
In order to further explore these questions, let us now turn to an examination 
of Kierkegaard’s picture of women as it is given throughout his indirect discourses.  
Though we must take caution to dance with the pseudonyms and not with 
Kierkegaard himself,2 we must also consider seriously the possibility that 
Kierkegaard is not as distant from his pseudonyms as he would have us believe.  
Because Kierkegaard’s relationship with the women of his text is riddled with 
ambiguity, we will be forced to draw our own conclusions as to how to read the 
indirect discourses on women so that we may attempt to gain insight into this 
enigmatic relationship.  
 
Kierkegaard’s Early Thoughts on Women 
Kierkegaard’s first published piece came in the form of a terribly 
misogynistic essay, ironically titled “Another Defense of Woman’s Great 
Abilities.”  In this very short and satirical essay, Kierkegaard (using the 
pseudonym “A.”) “paints exaggerated pictures of transformations that, in his 
opinion, are likely to occur in the wake of female liberation.  He resorts to ridicule 
[…] and pokes fun at the woman presumptuous enough to cross the boundaries 
naturally allotted to her sex” (Léon 1997, 118-119).  In part, Kierkegaard was 
responding in this essay to the uprising of women in France, which accompanied 
other revolutionary ideas of the time.  His piece also came as a response to a 
similar piece written by a fellow student, Peter Lind, but Kierkegaard’s essay 
demonstrates a far more cutting wit than that of Lind.  And unlike Lind, 
Kierkegaard chose to publish this first essay pseudonymously, which must not be 
ignored as we examine it; though it cannot be known for certain whether or not 
Kierkegaard meant what he said in this essay about women, the fact that he 
distanced himself from these misogynistic statements cannot be taken lightly.  Still, 
he was the author of the pseudonym, and so he is connected to the essay indirectly.  
This means that his misogyny cannot be wholly dismissed.   
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym A. presents woman by way of irony as Western 
patriarchy has traditionally done: he mocks woman for her lack of philosophical 
inclination, her domestic nature, her nagging tendencies, and her supposed 
connection to nature.  He does so in such a way that the naïve reader might actually 
believe that he is praising woman for these attributes, when in actuality he draws 
the stereotype of woman in such a negative light that no one would consider 
emancipating her.      
History throughout the ages shows that woman’s great abilities have 
at least in part been recognized.  Hardly was man created before we 
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find Eve already as audience at the snake’s philosophical lectures, and 
we see that she mastered them with such ease that at once she could 
utilize the results of the same in her domestic practice. […]  Yet not 
all were thus torn from life in order to brood on more abstract 
subjects.  A great majority sought rather to assert their competence in 
life.  As speaker, woman has so great a talent that she has made 
history with her own special line: the so-called bed-hangings sermons, 
curtain lectures, etc., and Xanthippe is still remembered as a pattern of 
feminine eloquence and as founder of a school that has lasted to this 
very day, whereas Socrates’ school has long since disappeared.  
Although Christianity was certainly hard on women by forbidding 
them to speak at meetings, it still allowed them an arena for their 
eloquence inside the home.  And when the rabbis forbade them to put 
in their word, it was solely because they were afraid that the women 
would outshine them or expose their folly.  In the Middle Ages, the 
countless witch trials sufficiently showed the deep insight woman had 
into the secrets of nature. (Kierkegaard 1978, 3) 
Because this scathing presentation of women was Kierkegaard’s first 
published piece, we may read it as his early thoughts on woman’s liberation; 
however, the fact that he employed the pseudonym complicates this reading.  Let 
us now look at some of his other pseudonymous works in order to gain a greater 
idea as to whether this thread of misogyny continues throughout his indirect 
discourses, and so that we might decide what this means for a feminist reading of 
Kierkegaard.   
 
The Depiction of Women in The Seducer’s Diary: Misogyny as a Means to 
Blacken the Breast 
The Seducer’s Diary, Kierkegaard’s attempt to wean Regine Olsen from 
their relationship via indirect communication,3 contains a great deal of 
misogynistic commentary on the nature of women.  Behind the guise of numerous 
pseudonyms, Kierkegaard presents women stereotypically as beings-for-others: for 
men.  The Seducer’s Diary therefore adds another complication to a feminist 
reading of Kierkegaard.  Because Kierkegaard’s own authorship is hidden within 
the authorship of the pseudonyms “‘like the boxes in a Chinese puzzle’” (Updike 
1997, viii), it is difficult to determine whether the sexist view of the seducer 
reflects Kierkegaard’s own attitude towards women, or whether he distanced 
himself from it precisely because he did not share the seducer’s extreme misogyny.  
This is a puzzle that will perhaps remain forever unsolved, but again we must take 
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seriously the words of the pseudonym in order to gain some glimpse into 
Kierkegaard’s own thoughts on women.  Unlike the aforementioned essay 
“Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities,” The Seducer’s Diary is in many 
ways autobiographical, and so we may be forced to assume that some of the 
seducer’s thoughts on women mirror Kierkegaard’s own.  On the other hand, the 
nature of the Diary might also be a hindrance to this sort of reading: because 
Kierkegaard wrote The Seducer’s Diary so that Regine would turn away from their 
relationship (as a means of blackening the breast for weaning, as he later says), we 
perhaps should not take the seducer’s words as Kierkegaard’s own, simply because 
the words were meant to repel Regine from him.  His sexist comments could have 
been his particular method of repellant; the misogynistic remarks of the seducer 
perhaps were directed towards Regine so that she would be scandalized by the 
comments and think Kierkegaard a villain.  With this in mind, it is necessary to 
explore the view of women presented by the seducer in the Diary so that we might 
better understand the problem at hand. 
John Updike, in his foreword to The Seducer’s Diary, situates Kierkegaard 
within a long tradition of misogynistic philosophers.  He explains that Kierkegaard 
harbored distaste for the sexual side of life, and implies that he blamed women for 
this.  Updike tells us that for Kierkegaard woman is man’s destruction, which 
explains Kierkegaard’s breaking of his engagement to Regine: “‘Woman,’ he 
wrote in 1854, ‘is egoism personified…. The whole story of man and woman is an 
immense and subtly constructed intrigue, or it is a trick calculated to destroy man 
as spirit.’ […]  Kierkegaard’s breaking the engagement perhaps needs less 
explaining than the imperious impulse that led him into it” (Updike 1997, xii).  So, 
while we may be inclined to separate Kierkegaard’s own view of women from that 
of the seducer, this is indeed the same brand of misogyny that we find the seducer 
spouting throughout the Diary. 
The seducer repeatedly makes misogynistic claims, such as “a young girl 
first becomes interesting in her relation with men.  The woman is the weaker sex” 
(Kierkegaard 1987, 54), and “woman’s fundamental qualification is to be company 
for the man” (Kierkegaard 1987, 55).  According to the seducer, women belong to 
nature, not reflection or intellect: intellect is the negation of womanliness.4  As 
such, she is naturally a being-for-other:    
I shall attempt to consider woman categorically.  In which category is 
she to be placed?  In the category of being-for-other. […] Here in 
turn, from a different angle, we must not let ourselves be disturbed by 
experience, which teaches us that very seldom do we meet a woman 
who is truly being-for-other, since the great majority usually are not 
entities at all, either for themselves or for others.  She shares this 
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qualification with all nature, with all femininity in general.  All nature 
is only for-other. (Kierkegaard 1987, 178) 
Woman is mothering and matter; she does not exist in the existential sense.  
Man is intellect, and woman exists only for man – she is developed by him, 
molded to be just the way he likes her (Kierkegaard 1987, 127).  Men, on the other 
hand, exist only for themselves, and so are the true existential subjects.  Woman is 
immanence, whereas man is transcendence – woman is of nature, whereas man is 
beyond nature.  Hence, she is for-other in a most profound way: she is nothing 
without man to develop her, and even then she is not a being-for-herself.   
God, when he created Eve, had a deep sleep fall upon Adam, for 
woman is man’s dream.  The story teaches us in another way that 
woman is being-for-other.  That is, it says that Jehovah took one of 
man’s ribs.  If he had, for example, taken from man’s brain, woman 
would certainly have continued to be being-for-other, but the purpose 
was not that she should be a figment of the brain but something quite 
different.  She became flesh and blood, but precisely thereby she falls 
within the category of nature, which essentially is being-for-other.  
Not until she is touched by erotic love does she awaken; before that 
time she is a dream. (Kierkegaard 1987, 179) 
The seducer tells us that woman exists in a sort of vegetative state; she 
becomes free only through man, and even then the freedom is illusionary 
(Kierkegaard 1987, 180-181).   
The depiction of women drawn throughout The Seducer’s Diary is typical of 
a patriarchal male philosopher, but does Kierkegaard agree with the seducer 
regarding this conception of woman’s nature?  Was Kierkegaard just another 
Western misogynistic philosopher, a man of his time and in congress with the rest 
of his colleagues?  Or did he purposefully distance himself from the seducer via a 
pseudonym so that his own view of women could remain detached from this 
literary project?  Is his misogyny indeed only a method by which to wean, and so a 
sort of negative maieutics meant to awaken Regine to the knowledge that he is bad 
for her?  In order to explore these questions further, let us now turn to the view of 
women we glimpse throughout Kierkegaard’s other indirect discourses. 
 
Kierkegaard – A Friend for Feminists: Female Knights of Faith 
In Kierkegaard’s great exposition of faith, Fear and Trembling, women are 
depicted in quite another light.  This work is again written in the voice of a 
pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, and yet the reader may justly feel inclined to 
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hear Kierkegaard’s own voice in Silentio’s words.  Unlike the earlier 
pseudonymous discourses, Fear and Trembling can almost be read as a transition 
piece to the direct communication of Kierkegaard’s religious works.  Though it is 
clearly meant to be indirect, the tone of Fear and Trembling is far more religious 
than aesthetic or ethical, and so forces the reader to take the message a bit more 
seriously as Kierkegaard’s own thoughts.  For this reason, it is especially 
interesting to examine the view Silentio presents of women.  Contrary to the earlier 
pseudonymous works, Fear and Trembling portrays a few women worthy of 
feminist admiration.  
A notable example of one such woman in Fear and Trembling is the Virgin 
Mary, mother of Jesus.  Silentio asks, “Who was as great in the world as that 
favored woman, the mother of God, the Virgin Mary?” (Kierkegaard 1983, 64-65).  
Mary is remarkable not because God chose to bless her, favoring her above other 
women, but because she (like Abraham before her) had faith in the paradox: she 
was a knight of faith.  The blessing God bestowed on Mary was also a curse; no 
one else was aware of the divine nature of her pregnancy, and so to the world she 
must have been thought of as a woman of ill repute.  She was pregnant and not yet 
married, and only she was certain of her own virginity.  As a result of this 
“blessing,” Mary suffered the anguish of Abraham, and also shared his faith:   
The angel went only to Mary, and no one could understand her.  Has 
any woman been as infringed upon as was Mary, and is it not true 
here also that the one whom God blesses he curses in the same breath?  
This is the spirit’s view of Mary, and she is by no means – it is 
revolting to me to say it but even more so that people have inanely 
and unctuously made her out to be thus – she is by no means a lady 
idling in her finery and playing with a divine child.  When, despite 
this, she said: Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord – then she is 
great, and I believe it should not be difficult to explain why she 
became the mother of God.  She needs worldly admiration as little as 
Abraham needs tears, for she was no heroine and he was no hero, but 
both of them became greater than these, not by being exempted in any 
way from the distress and the agony and the paradox, but became 
greater by means of these. (Kierkegaard 1983, 65) 
Though Mary is not the main subject of Fear and Trembling, Silentio’s 
admiration for her is evident enough; Mary is also often admired by Kierkegaard’s 
other pseudonyms, and by Kierkegaard himself in his direct communication. 
There is another woman in Fear and Trembling who is described as a knight 
of faith: Sarah, from the book of Tobit.  Sarah, the young daughter of Raguel and 
Edna, had been married seven times.  On each one of her wedding nights, her new 
  11 
husbands had died tragically.  When Tobias desires to marry the forlorn Sarah, she 
consents to it with faith in God that this time her husband would not perish.  
Despite all of her earlier disappointments, she maintained her faith that she would 
be allowed her love this time (Kierkegaard 1983, 104).  Silentio is a great admirer 
of Mary and Sarah, for these women had faith in the paradox, and did not succumb 
to infinite resignation in the face of suffering; Mary had faith that everything 
would be all right as she trusted God and allowed him to use her as Jesus’ mother, 
and Sarah had faith in God that she would not always have to endure the death of a 
new husband, in spite of her past matrimonial misfortune.   
From these examples we can see that some of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms 
did have great respect for certain women, and believed that women are also 
capable of being faithful.  The importance of this cannot be underestimated: while 
Kierkegaard’s earlier pseudonyms expressed serious misogyny, the negative view 
of women is not shared by his latter pseudonyms, or at least not consistently.  As 
Kierkegaard began to write more and more on the subject of religion – and as he 
began to write directly with his right hand, signing his texts with his own name – 
this notion of a sort of egalitarianism between the sexes increases; we begin to hear 
him say that men and women are equal before God.  Yet by this is Kierkegaard 
promoting a feminist message?  Or is something else going on entirely?  Let us 
now explore this issue of egalitarianism further so as to better understand the 
possible shift in Kierkegaard’s view of women.   
 
Kierkegaard and Equality 
According to Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus in Philosophical 
Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Kierkegaard himself in 
Works of Love, we are all absolutely equal before God.  Whether one is a king or a 
carpenter, whether one lived during the year 0 or 2003, each person is equally 
responsible, and can equally have an absolute relationship to the absolute.  Our 
worldly circumstances do not affect our relationship to God.  Kierkegaard and his 
pseudonyms believe that inwardly we each have an interior space (a space that is 
not constituted by social structures), and this is where our one-to-one relationship 
to God exists.  Because of this God-relationship that each one of us is capable of 
having, there is a leveling effect which occurs, the leveling of the “before God.”  
All human differences are leveled; we are all equal before God. 
It is important to note that Works of Love is not signed pseudonymously: 
Kierkegaard meant for this work to be direct; he wrote it with his right hand.  This 
comes about as he discusses the differences between the love of the neighbor and 
pagan love.  By “neighbor” Kierkegaard refers to all human others, including our 
enemies.  The love of the neighbor is commanded by God, and as such is non-
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exclusionary and egalitarian.  (This is opposed to pagan love – erotic love and 
friendship – which is really another form of self-love and is based on inclination, 
not duty).  We all must love our neighbors equally, and not allow ourselves to feel 
a preference for some over others, or allow our own self-interest to interfere with 
our duty to our neighbor.  
However, this equal treatment of all our neighbors does not lead to equality 
of all people on earth – Kierkegaard is not advocating a revolution so that everyone 
will be equal politically, economically, and socially.  On the contrary, Christian 
love is all about the spirit, and so not concerned with these worldly issues.  
Christianity does not want to take away dissimilarity: it is merely worldliness.  
Rather, we must lift ourselves up above earthly dissimilarities.  So, Kierkegaard is 
not calling for political change; religiousness does not translate into politics.  Just 
because we are equal before God does not mean that we should be socially equal in 
the world.  The social/political order is a secular (pagan) order, and so has nothing 
to do with Christianity.  Inequalities do not matter to the existential Christian, for 
life is like a stage play: when the curtain closes on actuality, all of the costumes 
(the earthly garments of dissimilarity) come off; then, we are all just people before 
God.5  Kierkegaard tells us that death is the ultimate equalizer: it shows us clearly 
that God makes us all from one type of clay.  Sure, the rich get bigger grave plots, 
but in the end all the worldly riches amount to no more than another half a foot of 
cemetery room!  These earthly dissimilarities are that unimportant (Kierkegaard 
1995, 346). 
When this view is applied to woman’s liberation, it becomes difficult to use 
Kierkegaard’s notion of equality before God to feminist means. Kierkegaard 
himself spoke against woman’s emancipation in Works of Love, saying that 
Christianity does not desire the worldly equality of women: 
What abominations has the world not seen in the relationships 
between man and woman, that she, almost like an animal, was a 
disdained being in comparison with the man, a being of another 
species.  What battles there have been to establish in a worldly way 
the woman in equal rights with the man – but Christianity makes only 
infinity’s change and therefore quietly.  Outwardly the old more or 
less remains.  The man is to be the woman’s master and she 
subservient to him; but inwardly everything is changed, changed by 
means of this little question to the woman, whether she has consulted 
with her conscience about having this man – as master, for otherwise 
she does not get him.  Yet the conscience-question about the 
conscience-matter makes her in inwardness before God absolutely 
equal with the man.  What Christ said about his kingdom, that it is not 
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of this world, holds true of everything Christian.  As a higher order of 
things, it wants to be present everywhere but not to be seized.  Just as 
a friendly spirit surrounds the dear ones, follows their every step but 
cannot be pointed to, so the essentially Christian wants to be a 
stranger in life because it belongs to another world, a stranger in the 
world because it belongs to the inner being.  In the name of 
Christianity, fatuous people have fatuously been busy about making it 
obvious in a worldly way that the woman should be established in 
equal rights with the man – Christianity has never required or desired 
this.  It has done everything for the woman, provided she Christianly 
will be satisfied with what is Christian; if she is unwilling, then for 
what she loses she gains only a mediocre compensation in the 
fragment of externality she can in a worldly way obtain by defiance.  
(Kierkegaard 1995, 138-139)   
Feminism is intrinsically focused on worldly change, and so for Kierkegaard 
to say that the equality he is speaking of is not a worldly equality immediately 
prevents a feminist appropriation of Kierkegaard’s notion of equality.  Though we 
may all be equal before God, this does nothing to help aid the feminist cause of 
equality here on earth.  Theoretically, Kierkegaard’s concept of the equality of all 
humans before God is helpful to egalitarian feminists who believe bodily 
differences between men and women are irrelevant in terms of determining a 
person’s worth or capabilities, but practically speaking it is useless to feminists 
who desire change in the here and now.  
It should further be noted that not only was Kierkegaard uninterested in 
worldly inequality, he almost seemed to promote it, both in Works of Love (as the 
above comments indicate) and in his pseudonymously written Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments.  Johannes Climacus complains 
about democracy at the end of the Postscript, claiming that it forces everyone into 
political participation and is nothing better than a form of tyranny.  For this reason, 
he favors monarchy because it leaves the individual person alone to his thoughts 
(Kierkegaard 1992, 621).  Of course, he said this during a very revolutionary 
period in history, and so it is somewhat understandable that he was uneasy about 
politics.  As a member of the upper rung of society, Kierkegaard undoubtedly did 
not like the personal threat of political revolution; and so while he may have 
believed we are all equal before God, he also may not have wanted people to force 
social worldly equality on him.       
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Feminist Interpretations of Kierkegaard 
Given all of this, how might a feminist attempt to interpret Kierkegaard?  As 
is evident from the previous discussion, such an attempt is complicated by 
numerous factors: a feminist reader of Kierkegaard must take into account the 
pseudonymous nature of much of his work, and hence must also acknowledge the 
lack of a pseudonym attached to the upbuilding, religious works; she must address 
the various misogynistic and misogamist comments Kierkegaard and his 
pseudonyms utter; a feminist who desires to utilize Kierkegaard’s notion of 
equality before God for feminist ends must be aware that this equality is not of this 
world, and so does not motivate any social change.  All of this and more must be 
considered so that a reading does not grant Kierkegaard the title of feminist 
unduly, and also so that we do not criticize him undeservingly.  In their edited 
anthology of multifarious endeavors to determine how Kierkegaard fits into a 
feminist scheme, Céline Léon and Sylvia Walsh – along with a variety of feminist 
authors and Kierkegaard scholars – tackle this difficult problem.  Feminist 
Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard presents the varying and dynamic ways in 
which feminists can read Kierkegaard.     
Many of these feminist interpretations can be examined through the previous 
discussion of Kierkegaard in this paper.  For example, Wanda Warren Berry 
examines the problem of misogyny in Either/Or as it compares to the equality of 
all people before God in her essay “The Heterosexual Imagination and Aesthetic 
Existence in Kierkegaard’s Either/Or, Part I.”  Berry reads the androcentric view 
of women presented in Either/Or as negatively maieutic, rather than his actual 
viewpoint from the mouths of his pseudonyms.  Berry believes that Kierkegaard is 
“subverting fixed or stereotyped ideas of masculinity and femininity” so as to show 
“the limitations and the risks inherent in emphasizing difference and in depicting 
each sex as being fulfilled only through the other” (Léon and Walsh 1997, 6).  
Berry’s reading of Kierkegaard paints him in a positive light as a philosopher who 
aims to instigate constructive change in both men and women.6  She comes to this 
conclusion as a result of Kierkegaard’s notion in his religious writings (which, as 
discussed earlier, are signed with his own name) that all people are equal before 
God: 
To the stereotype of woman as ‘being-for-others’ corresponds that of 
man as being-for-self,’ with the result that, if man is able to separate 
himself from the ‘for-other’ moment of his own self, or relationality, 
woman is granted no ‘for-self.’ […]  By being ‘for-others,’ women, 
whose self-image is essentially ‘for man,’ are victims of an enemy 
whose views they have internalized.  Yet, they are no more 
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ontologically ‘for-other’ than men are ontologically ‘for-self’: Both 
man and woman are equally ‘before God.’  For a fuller treatment of 
these questions, Berry directs the reader to The Concept of Anxiety 
(1844) where, although emphasized, the ‘generic difference,’ or 
inherent differences between the sexes, is declared ultimately 
irrelevant within the context of the religious.  (Léon and Walsh 1997, 
6-7) 
In this reading, the latter religious writings of Kierkegaard are thought to 
reveal his true thoughts on the sexes, and his earlier aesthetic works are merely the 
means by which he pushes people towards existential action.   
Birgit Bertung reads Kierkegaard in a similar manner in her essay “Yes, A 
Woman Can Exist”; for Bertung, Kierkegaard is a sort of gadfly, an instigator who 
writes his misogyny in order to goad women towards existential action.  Given this 
cancellation of sexual distinction expressed in his religious writings combined with 
the pseudonymous nature of his aesthetic works, Bertung claims that we must read 
Kierkegaard dialectically, taking into account the fact that his aesthetic writings are 
not always meant to be read literally (Bertung 1997, 52).  Kierkegaard uses indirect 
communication, Bertung believes, because he intends for the reader to 
misunderstand his true meaning; only through this method will the reader reach 
self-understanding and be motivated to existential action.  Bertung claims that this 
even applies to women,7 and she goes so far in her defense of Kierkegaard as to 
claim that “any discrimination against women is in my opinion a projection by the 
reader.  Kierkegaard in his entire philosophy tried to draw attention to this 
misunderstanding” (Bertung 1997, 66).  Read in this way, Kierkegaard becomes a 
sort of feminist.  
 In perhaps a more balanced approach to interpreting Kierkegaard for 
feminism, Jane Duran argues in her essay “The Kierkegaardian Feminist” that in 
spite of the expressed misogyny in The Seducer’s Diary and other works, 
Kierkegaard is in fact a friend of feminism in that he critiqued traditional Western 
philosophy for attributes that recent feminists have identified as androcentric (its 
privileging of detachment and objectivity) and opened up a space within 
philosophy which recognizes the subjectivity and the particularity of people, a 
focus that is emphasized in feminist theory.  Duran claims that what “distinguishes 
the thought of Kierkegaard from typical androcentric styles of thinking – divorced, 
detached, and objectifying, such as those found in Kant or Descartes – is, on the 
one hand, its emphasis on specificity, individuality, and a holism that emphasizes 
connectedness, and on the other hand, its predilection for devoted commitment and 
passionate attachment to others” (Léon and Walsh 1997, 17).  Sylvia Walsh shares 
this variety of interpretation, acknowledging the debt feminism owes to 
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Kierkegaard for this revolution in Western philosophy.  This interpretation of 
Kierkegaard is of particular interest as we examine the relationship between 
Kierkegaard and Simone de Beauvoir in the final section of this paper. 
Not all of the feminists who interpret Kierkegaard in Léon and Walsh’s 
anthology read him in a positive light, and most strive to balance the positive with 
the critically honest and often negative.  But none of the essayists in Feminist 
Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard read him as a straight misogynist, though it 
would have been far easier to simply label him a woman-hater than to truly 
navigate through the complicated landmines that are his works; like all 
philosophers of the nineteenth century, he is an obvious target for such an attack.  
What feminist interpreters of Kierkegaard instead strive towards is a way of 
reading him that benefits feminism, either by reclaiming him as a different sort of 
feminist or by exposing the logic behind his misogyny.  When read in this way, 
Kierkegaard proves to be a valuable resource for feminist philosophy. 
 
Kierkegaard and Beauvoir 
Yet another way to examine the impact of Kierkegaard on feminism is to 
observe the ways in which he influenced the thinking of Simone de Beauvoir, 
arguably the most illustrious feminist philosopher of our time.  Beauvoir reflects 
many of Kierkegaard’s concerns, and takes his notion of the situated existential 
subject to another level by utilizing existentialism as well as phenomenology 
within a feminist framework.  Though she rarely mentions Kierkegaard in her 
philosophical writings – only a few times in The Ethics of Ambiguity,8 and when 
she mentions him at all in The Second Sex it is to criticize his negative view of 
women9 – Beauvoir owes a great deal to Kierkegaard philosophically.  Because 
this helps us to understand the import of Kierkegaard to feminism via another (as 
of yet scarcely charted) avenue, some of the ways in which Kierkegaard has 
influenced Beauvoir’s philosophy will be explored in the final section of this 
paper.   
Though Kierkegaard is considered to be the father of existentialism, the 
French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre emphatically denied the influence of the 
Dane on his own existential philosophy.  It was Sartre’s friend, lover, and 
companion philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir, who admitted Kierkegaard’s 
influence on her philosophical development.  In her autobiography The Prime of 
Life, Beauvoir tells the tale of her philosophical growth; originally enamored with 
the comfort of the Hegelian System (as were so many philosophers of the 1930s 
and early 1940s), Beauvoir began to turn away from what she recognized as a false 
source of solace, and moved towards Kierkegaard’s existentialism.         
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‘I went on reading Hegel, and was now beginning to understand him 
rather better.  His amplitude of detail dazzled me, and his System as a 
whole made me feel giddy.  It was indeed tempting to abolish one’s 
individual self and merge with Universal Being, to observe one’s own 
life in the perspective of Historical Necessity…. But the least flutter 
of my heart gave such speculations the lie.  Hate, anger, expectation 
or misery would assert themselves against all my efforts to by-pass 
them, and this ‘flight into the Universal’ merely formed one further 
episode in my private development.  I turned back to Kierkegaard, and 
began to read him with passionate interest…. Neither History, nor the 
Hegelian System could, any more than the Devil in person, upset the 
living certainty of ‘I am, I exist, here and now, I am myself.’’ (Poole 
1998, 55) 
From this we can see that Kierkegaard had an effect on Beauvoir’s 
development as a philosopher, perhaps more than he is given credit for.  Though 
Beauvoir employs a great deal of Hegelian concepts, it is clear from this statement 
in her autobiography that she sided with Kierkegaard in his dislike of the Hegelian 
System, favoring existence over Hegel’s ideality. 
In order to properly understand the profound impact Kierkegaard had on 
feminism through Beauvoir, we must keep in mind the philosophical tradition from 
which Kierkegaard defected.  Not only was the Hegelian System highly 
problematic for the existential philosopher, but Western philosophy’s 
epistemological conceptions were also found to be deficient.  Western philosophy 
had hitherto traditionally conceived of the knowing subject as “an autonomous, 
dispassionate, detached individual who has the capacity to adopt the stance of an 
independent, neutral observer in relation to the external world and to suppress or 
eliminate personal, or merely subjective, feelings, interests, and values in coming 
to know and describe that world” (Walsh 1997, 268).10  Kierkegaard’s rejection of 
universalism and the objective knower, which came in the form of a harsh criticism 
of the Hegelians, ripped the fabric of traditional philosophy to shreds.  He brought 
philosophy back to the existing world, and validated the experiences of existing 
subjects; by placing the emphasis on the particular over the universal, on the 
subjective over the objective, Kierkegaard dramatically questioned the way we 
think of truth and choice.   
This is especially significant to keep in mind as we examine the influence of 
Kierkegaard on Beauvoir.  These are some of the same questions asked by 
Beauvoir, questions central to her own philosophical explorations: 
What is the relation between an individual’s freedom and the 
givenness of his or her situation?  What is the nature of self-identity?  
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How is the individual related to society?  What is the ontological 
structure of an individual’s relation to the world?  How does one make 
moral choices without a set of universal moral absolutes?  What is the 
relation between truth and the knowing subject?  These crucial 
questions are all inspired by Kierkegaard […].  They are also the key 
questions for Beauvoir.  (Fullbrook and Fullbrook 1998, 61)     
Kierkegaard’s existential subject, taken up by subsequent existentialists such 
as Sartre and Beauvoir, pushed aside the old objective knower of philosophy, and 
introduced a new philosophy of subjectivity in place of the old universal systems.  
The impact of all of this on Beauvoir’s thought is profoundly evident in The Ethics 
of Ambiguity.      
Beauvoir locates herself within the Kierkegaardian tradition of 
existentialism in The Ethics of Ambiguity  (Beauvoir 1948, 9-10).  In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity, Beauvoir undertakes the project of developing an existential ethics.  
She presents an ethics that is not systematic, but rather situated: relational, and yet 
also individualistic.  Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity has its roots in Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism; however, for Beauvoir God is not a part of the existential picture.  
Starting with the existential assumption that “existence precedes essence” – there is 
no outside guiding force determining a person’s actions and character, and so there 
are no absolute, external justifications – Beauvoir attempts to reveal how humans 
can manage to act ethically within this existential framework. 
Though The Ethics of Ambiguity reflects Kierkegaardian notions throughout, 
I will only briefly touch on these connections for the purpose of showing the 
Kierkegaardian roots of Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy.  In this work, which is 
arguably the most philosophical of her writings, Beauvoir elucidates many 
Kierkegaardian themes; among other things, she discusses the importance of the 
existential moment and human freedom, describes the problem of seriousness, and 
expresses a dislike for universal ethical systems. 
Beauvoir draws out the importance of freedom and the existential moment in 
her discussions of the “aesthetic attitude” and oppression.  A person falls into the 
aesthetic attitude when she stops actively living life, resigning herself to the idea 
that the present is merely a “potential past.”  The serious person – one possessing 
the aesthetic attitude – is detached from the real living of the world; this person 
ceases to participate in life in the here and now.  This refusal to live in the here and 
now is to Beauvoir a denial of freedom, since the present is the moment of choice.  
To every person the present exists as an engagement; we act and are situated 
within this existential moment.  Our actions require freedom, which only realizes 
itself by “engaging itself in the world” of the here and now.  This existential 
understanding of the importance of freedom inspired Beauvoir’s feminist 
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philosophy, which is evident in her analysis of oppression, or the denial of freedom 
to another human being.  When a man oppresses another, he cuts the other off from 
the future and makes her into a thing.  But humans are not things: “rational 
animals,” “thinking reeds,” we are subject and object, a part of this world of which 
we are a consciousness (Beauvoir 1948, 7).  In other words, we are ambiguous.  
Oppression is an evil because with it man attempts to deny this ambiguity, (and 
hence to deny freedom), to his fellow humans.  Freedom is a “universal cause” 
(Beauvoir 1948, 90), and as such all humans should seek to assist others in the 
attainment of their freedom.  Freedom for the individual must be realized, since 
without the free individual, society would be nothing.  Freedom entails that the 
individual be allowed to possess hope for and to make decisions regarding the 
future, and yet not forget to live in the present: “Existence must be asserted in the 
present if one does not want all life to be defined as an escape toward nothingness” 
(Beauvoir 1948, 125).   
This is the importance of the existential moment, the here and now: “If one 
denies with Hegel the concrete thickness of the here and now in favor of universal 
space-time, if one denies the separate consciousness in favor of Mind, one misses 
with Hegel the truth of the world” (Beauvoir 1948, 122).  If we live too much for 
the future, we cease to live; there is comfort in the thought of a future of absolutes, 
a future in which all is resolved, but this is an empty comfort.  Human 
undertakings are finite.  Though this is a daunting realization, it must be made so 
that we can live fully in the here and now.  The action we have chosen must be 
enough justification for us without the “mythical Historical end,” since we can 
never know if this end will be realized (Beauvoir 1948, 128); the ethical 
ramification of this concept of the existential moment for Beauvoir is that each 
action must be considered on its own merits, and not merely justified by an appeal 
to ends.   
Existential ethics cannot make an appeal to any sort of absolute justification 
(Beauvoir 1948, 136), and so Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity is not a recipe for 
ethical action.  Because Beauvoir’s existential ethics rejects principles of authority 
and recipes for ethical action, it requires of people a little creativity.  This is 
obviously very disconcerting: without any moral absolutes to fall back on, humans 
are forced to own their ethical decisions to a greater extent.  (We cannot justify 
them with “Kant made me do it… damn that categorical imperative!” – blaming 
our actions on universal laws).  But despite the trepidation we may feel, this is the 
way we form ourselves, the way we set up our values.  Beauvoir describes this 
feeling of unease that we may feel as we attempt to own our freedom as “the 
anguish of free decision” (Beauvoir 1948, 149).   
 This brings us back to Kierkegaard, the originator of this notion of 
existential singularity.  This ethics of ambiguity as described by Beauvoir is not the 
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sort of universal ethics that Johannes de Silentio rejected in Fear and Trembling.  
This is rather an ethics that can be likened to the religious, singular decision of the 
faithful.  In Fear and Trembling, Abraham was not able to fall back on the 
universal edict “thou shall not kill,” but rather he was forced to make a choice: he 
acted in faith, and so decided to obey God’s command to sacrifice Isaac.  While 
faith is not a part of Beauvoir’s existential ethics, it is clear that Kierkegaard’s 
concept of an existential individual’s decision, a decision that might contradict the 
universal, is an important part of Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity.  What Beauvoir 
describes as the anguish of free decision, Kierkegaard calls fear and trembling.  
Their shared critique of the serious man illustrates this similarity between them.  
For Beauvoir, the serious man is one who attempts to fall back on the universal, 
refusing to exercise his own freedom.  This criticism of the serious man originated 
with Kierkegaard: 
After Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche also railed at the deceitful 
stupidity of the serious man and his universe. […] The serious man 
gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which 
would be unconditioned. […] There is the serious from the moment 
that freedom denies itself to the advantages of ends which one claims 
are absolute.  (Beauvoir 1948, 46) 
The serious man “escapes the anguish of freedom” (Beauvoir 1948, 51), 
“dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his choice” (Beauvoir 1948, 49).  The 
similarity between Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity and the ethico-religious 
singularity Silentio describes lies here, in the existing individual rising above the 
comfort of the universal in spite of the fear and trembling that accompanies 
freedom.    
There are necessarily minor pragmatic differences between Beauvoir’s 
ethics of ambiguity and Kierkegaard’s existentialism; for Beauvoir, the ethics of 
ambiguity is actually an ethics in that it involves other people in an essential way, 
while for Silentio in Fear and Trembling existentialism is primarily about the 
individual knight of faith and the God-relationship.  Kierkegaard’s existentialism is 
largely individualistic; he places great emphasis on the particularity of individuals, 
and even claims that the validity of the God-relationship rests on individual human 
differences (Kierkegaard 1995, 230).  Though this may seem to be a drastic 
difference between the two, Beauvoir still shares Kierkegaard’s focus on 
individualism, and so Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity does not really differ much.  
Beauvoir’s ethics is very individualistic; Beauvoir claims that the world has 
no importance without the individual and individual differences: “Arguing for an 
‘irreducible given that constitutes the individuality’ of each one, Beauvoir defends 
individual differences and rejects the argument that persons can ever be identical” 
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(Simons 1999, 114).  Beauvoir’s existential ethics centers around the way in which 
existential individuals deal with other existential individuals: “the individual is 
defined only by his relationship to the world and to other individuals; he exists 
only by transcending himself, and his freedom can be achieved only through the 
freedom of others.  He justifies his existence by a movement which, like freedom, 
springs from his heart but which leads outside of him” (Beauvoir 1948, 156).  Part 
of the ambiguity of human existence is that we are both social and individual.  “It 
is true that each is bound to all; but that is precisely the ambiguity of his condition: 
in his surpassing toward others, each one exists absolutely as for himself; each is 
interested in the liberation of all, but as a separate existence engaged in his own 
projects” (Beauvoir 1948, 112).  
For Beauvoir, the sociality of humans means that subjective truth can be 
expanded to whole cultures, or to all of humanity.  Without moral absolutes, 
humankind is free to determine what is true and what is false (Beauvoir 1948, 157-
158).  These subjective human determinations are finite, which may make them 
unsatisfactory for many who want the infinite in the form of universal truths and 
laws; the universal is far more mollifying.  Beauvoir explains that this is why 
Hegel’s system had been so comforting to her at one point, but “once I got into the 
street again, into my life, out of the system, beneath a real sky, the system was no 
longer of any use to me: what it had offered me, under a show of the infinite, was 
the consolations of death; and I again wanted to live in the midst of living men” 
(Beauvoir 1948, 158).  Though existentialism fails to offer much consolation, “its 
ethics is experienced in the truth of life, and it then appears as the only proposition 
of salvation which one can address to men” (Beauvoir 1948, 159).  Existential 
passion is enough for Beauvoir; she, like Kierkegaard, does not require the comfort 
of universal systems. 
While Kierkegaard and Beauvoir share this existential passion, they disagree 
on the fundamental issue of religious faith.  Whereas for Kierkegaard “Faith is the 
highest passion in a person” (Kierkegaard 1983, 122), for Beauvoir it cannot be a 
part of her existential picture.  This is revealed in her diaries from the early part of 
her life, as Margaret Simons discusses in her essay “The Origins of Beauvoir’s 
Existential Philosophy.”  Beauvoir writes of religion and especially of faith in her 
1927 diary: 
‘Mademoiselle Mercier is trying to convert me;... and I’m thinking of 
the remark of Georgette Lévy [Beauvoir’s friend and fellow 
philosophy student]: ‘You will be tempted that way.’  It’s true.  This 
morning... I passionately desired to be the girl who takes communion 
at morning mass and walks in a serene certainty.  Catholicism of 
Mauriac, of Claudel... how it’s marked me and what place there is in 
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me for it!  and yet I know that I will know it no longer; I do not desire 
to believe: an act of faith is the most despairing act there is and I want 
my despair to at least keep its lucidity, I do not what to lie to myself.’ 
(Simons 1999, 113) 
Beauvoir relates faith to a form of self-deception, and though it does sound 
appealing to her, she steers clear of faith and religion mainly because she does not 
want to become detached from the world of the here and now; Beauvoir’s rejection 
of religious faith is rooted in her desire to preserve the truth of her existential 
experience, however humble it may be.  For this reason, Beauvoir turns “to 
description of the phenomenal world” and she attempts “to construct a philosophy 
from her own experience” (Simons 1999, 117): an existential phenomenology. 
 Though Beauvoir moves away from Kierkegaard fundamentally in that she 
rejects the religious, and departs from him slightly in her attempt to create an 
existential ethics (which inherently had to involve the way individuals interact with 
one another), she only meant to improve on his original existential ideas: she 
wanted to accurately describe her own lived experience and to take the social 
nature of humans into account.   In spite of these differences, she retains much of 
his ideas.  A careful look shows the influence clearly; Beauvoir reflects 
Kierkegaard’s concern for the preservation of individualism and his distain for 
universal systems, and takes up his notion of the free situated existential subject, 
utilizing it throughout her feminist philosophy.  Further, she maintains the validity 
of subjective truth, and shares Kierkegaard’s existential passion.  Beauvoir made 
considerable use of the foundations Kierkegaard had laid out, and feminism has 
been richer for it.     
 
Reluctant Conclusions 
It would be presumptuous to suppose that I can draw any real conclusion in 
this explorative paper.  The possibilities for further exploration into the connection 
between Kierkegaard and feminism are nearly endless, and the terrain will 
continue to be rugged.  Kierkegaard did not make it easy for any student of his 
thought to nail down his precise meaning when it comes to these issues, and 
perhaps feminism is all the better for it.  The more we hermeneutically examine 
these works, the more we can learn – not only about Kierkegaard, but also about 
ourselves.     
The connection between Kierkegaard and Simone de Beauvoir is but one 
way to consider the importance of Kierkegaard to feminism.  Despite the many 
complications Kierkegaard poses for feminist philosophy, there are just as many 
benefits to be reaped from feminist interpretations of and expansions upon his 
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thoughts.  Therefore, we cannot allow his assumed or even actual misogyny to 
prevent such explorations.  Kierkegaard turned philosophy on its head, initiating a 
revolution that feminists can be unabashedly grateful for; the existential feminist 
philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir is to a great extent a result of this legacy. 
Kierkegaard’s works should be read critically so that his misogynistic 
statements (and those of his pseudonyms) are not permitted to seep unquestioned 
into our consciousnesses, and yet we also must not refrain from reading him, 
discounting him due to our vexation with these statements: he still has a great deal 
to teach us, even if this lesson is fueled by indignation.  The offence Kierkegaard 
inflames within his feminist readers can be educational and inspirational, as it 
motivates us to reject the androcentrism he puts forth.  But I believe he has a great 
deal more to offer feminist philosophers than merely this angry call to feminist 
action, even if his exact place as a benefactor to feminist philosophy is complicated 
by the multiplicity of ways in which we can read Kierkegaard:  
Was Kierkegaard a feminist maieutically pretending otherwise?  Was 
he a good father who, with a little help from a feminist re-vision, can 
bring an important message of liberation to culturally conditioned 
women?  Or do his very limitations make him a father whose insights 
should be carefully sorted out?  Is he, rather, just another ‘dead-beat 
dad,’ who fails to deliver on the promise of freedom made to women?  
When all is said and done, does Kierkegaard teach us anything that 
can be useful for feminist theorizing, or for women interested in 
finding themselves outside the maze of patriarchal constructs?  The 
answer is yes, insofar as his writings expose prejudices against 
women, subvert typically masculine modes of behavior and discourse, 
and, by privileging a disembodied, authorial voice, not only value, but 
also inscribe, the feminine.  But it is also yes when emancipation is 
opposed, when equality is in(de)finitely postponed, when woman is 
depreciated, dichotomized, discarded, excluded, or spoken for, when 
stereotypes and essentialist statements about her nature are taken up 
and embraced.  For, whether we agree, or disagree, much can be 
learned from an exposure whereby, either way, what is awakened is 
‘dead or sleeping consciousness.’ (Léon and Walsh 1997, 21)     
Awakening “dead or sleeping consciousness” was indeed Kierkegaard’s 
intent in both his pseudonymous writings and his direct upbuilding discourses.  
Though it is difficult – perhaps impossible – to unearth a single core of meaning 
from Kierkegaard’s philosophy, we can be confident in our understanding that 
Kierkegaard meant to incite a change in people: he certainly desired to shake 
people out of their Hegelian slumber and awaken them to existential Christianity.  
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While it is unlikely that he intended to motivate any sort of feminist awakening, he 
did effect a great change within the canon of Western philosophy, a change that 
has been felt profoundly by feminism.  Feminism developed in the wake of 
Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy, and so it is well worth our while to continue 
on this journey through Kierkegaard’s funhouse; in our efforts to explore his world 
of smoke and mirrors, (and even in our failed attempts to draw maps of the terrain), 
feminists gain insight into our own philosophical heritage and are inspired to ask 





                                         
1 Kierkegaard created a space within philosophy for the subjective, and so “if the gynocentric, seen from the 
standpoint of both feminist ethics and feminist epistemology, may be thought to be that which alludes to notions of 
specificity, connectedness, and particularity, rather than the universal, the detached, and the normative, it may be 
possible to analyze at least some of Kierkegaard’s authorship in terms that may be useful – perhaps extremely useful 
– to feminist theory” (Duran 1997, 250). 
  
2 In “A First and Last Explanation,” at the end of the Postscript, he asks us to “dance with” the “poetically actual 
author,” and to refrain from becoming “encumbered with [Kierkegaard’s] personal actuality”  (Kierkegaard 1992, 
628). 
 
3 “His journal of 1849 claims that he wrote it ‘for her sake, to clarify her out of the relationship.’  In 1853 he notes 
that ‘it was written to repel her’ and quotes his Fear and Trembling: ‘When the baby is to be weaned, the mother 
blackens her breast” (Updike 1997, xii). 
 
4 He describes man as intellect in the Diary: “Cordelia hates and fears me.  What does a young girl fear?  Intellect 
[Aand].  Why?  Because intellect constitutes the negation of her entire womanly existence” (Kierkegaard 1987, 85).   
 
5 “Just look at the world that lies before you in all its variegated multifariousness; it is like looking at a play, except 
that the multifariousness is much, much greater.  Because of his dissimilarity, every single one of these innumerable 
individuals is something particular, represents something particular, but essentially he is something else.  Yet this 
you do not get to see here in life; here you see only what the individual represents and how he does it.  It is just as in 
the play.  But when the curtain falls on the stage, then the one who played the king and the one who played the 
beggar etc. are all alike; all are one and the same – actors.  When at death the curtain falls on the stage of actuality (it 
is a confusing use of language to say that at death the curtain is raised on the stage of eternity since eternity is not a 
stage at all; it is truth), then they, too, are all one, they are human beings.  […] We seem to have forgotten that the 
dissimilarity of earthly life is just like an actor’s costume” (Kierkegaard 1995, 86-87). 
 
6 This reading of Kierkegaard as a sort of gadfly who attempts to provoke women maieutically may be farfetched, 
but it is not impossible to imagine that this was his intent.  His hero, after all, was Socrates; in Philosophical 
Fragments Johannes Climacus praises Socrates for his maieutic method, claiming that this “relation is the highest 
relation a human being can have to another” (Kierkegaard 1985, 10). 
 
7 “He does not wish to stand in the way of any woman’s own resolution of her existential situation, so he wishes to 
be misunderstood, and he must be said to have succeeded overwhelmingly.  The use of this method, he thinks, is the 
only way he can make people react, and that is the whole aim of all his works, to get one to act for oneself, even if 
he has to trick the reader cunningly into the truth” (Bertung 1997, 53-54). 
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8 (Beauvoir 1948, 9, 46, 133) 
 
9 (Beauvoir 1989, 143, 186, 256, 438, 720) 
 
10 Feminists have widely claimed that this conventional Western understanding of epistemology “reflects a typically 
masculine way of relating to the world and thus actually represents an androcentric, male-biased, and male-
constructed perspective rather than a gender-neutral stance toward reality” (Walsh 1997, 268-269).  Because of this 
concept of objectivity and the neutrally observing knowing subject, women have been excluded from activities that 
are considered to require objectivity – activities such as philosophy and science – since women have traditionally 
been associated with the subjective (such as feelings, emotions, and personal relationships), which supposedly 
prevent women from being objective subjects.  Sylvia Walsh shows that Kierkegaard helped to dispel this notion of 
the objective knowing subject, and instead placed a crucial emphasis on the existential subjectivity of the individual ; 
Walsh argues in her essay “Subjectivity Versus Objectivity: Kierkegaard’s Postscript and Feminist Epistemology” 
that Kierkegaard is “both a philosophical precursor of and ally in this [feminist] critique” of objective epistemology, 
and also an “important resources for re-visioning the concept of subjectivity in a manner that does not collapse into 
an isolated subjectivism, on the one hand, or into a ‘chummy’ form of intersubjectivity that compromises the 
integrity of the individual, on the other” (Walsh 1997, 267).   
 
